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Cake day: June 13th, 2023

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  • “AI” coding tools can offer some value. The problem is that they often generate tech debt with pay day loan level interest rates. What’s made the interest rate so high is that now, not only do you have the actual code base tech debt. You also have a bunch of code that no one understands and the barrier to entry for software engineering has become so high that fewer younger people are actually learning how to be good programmers. Lots of organizations don’t give a shit about their rapidly growing mountain of tech debt today but they’re sure going to at the end of the week when the payment comes due.

    What their “leadership” fails to understand is that any idiot can shell out code. I’ve seen lots of terrible programmers generate millions of lines of really shitty code that somehow, by the power of the dark Lord himself, manages to compile. That’s not what a software engineer actually does though. Software engineers design operational systems with software. Writing code is a secondary function of that. There are currently no AI agents that can successfully design a software system with any degree of complexity because LLM’s don’t actually understand anything.













  • On December 15, 1953, led by Paul Hahn, the head of American Tobacco, the six major tobacco companies (American Tobacco Co., R. J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, Benson & Hedges, U.S. Tobacco Co., and Brown & Williamson) met with public relations company Hill & Knowlton in New York City to create an advertisement that would assuage the public’s fears and create a false sense of security in order to regain the public’s confidence in the tobacco industry.[12] Hill and Knowlton’s president, John W. Hill, realized that simply denying the health risks would not be enough to convince the public. Instead, a more effective method would be to create a major scientific controversy in which the scientifically established link between smoking tobacco and lung cancer would appear not to be conclusively known.[13]

    The tobacco companies fought against the emerging science by producing their own science, which suggested that existing science was incomplete and that the industry was not motivated by self-interest.[11] With the creation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, headed by accomplished scientist C.C. Little, the tobacco companies manufactured doubt and turned scientific findings into a topic of debate. The recruitment of credentialed scientists like Little who were skeptics was a crucial aspect of the tobacco companies’ social engineering plan to establish credibility against anti-smoking reports. By amplifying the voices of a few skeptical scientists, the industry created an illusion that the larger scientific community had not reached a conclusive agreement on the link between smoking and cancer.[11]

    Internal documents released through whistleblowers and litigation, such as the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, reveal that while advertisements like A Frank Statement made tobacco companies appear to be responsible and concerned for the health of their consumers, in reality, they were deceiving the public into believing that smoking did not have health risks. The whole project was aimed at protecting the tobacco companies’ images of glamour and all-American individualism at the cost of the public’s health.[14]

    A Frank Statement